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Abstract 
A Hegelianized version of Althusser’s concept of problematic is used to 
investigate the underlying theoretical unity and structure of Arabic physical 
science (physics, astronomy and chemistry). A contradictory triad ( associated 
with Platonism, Aristotelianism and Ptolemaism) is identified at the heart of 
the Arabic project for physical science. The paper focuses on the valiant 
attempts made by leading Arabic scientists to overcome these contradictions 
without transcending or tearing apart the prevailing problematic. The 
following question is then addressed: why was Arabic physical science 
reformist, rather than revolutionary, unlike Renaissance European physical 
science? An answer is proposed in terms of the history, nature and decline of 
Arabic rationalism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
My investigations into modern 
physical theories and their 
interconnections and mechanisms of 
development have led me to the idea that 
the principal mechanism of progress in 
modern physical theory is a process of 
unification which dialectically resolves 
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contradictions inherent in the heart of 
physical theory. Such a process drives 
physical theory beyond its own structure 
of premises and meaning; it is a process 
of transcendence (Ghassib, 1988; 
Ghassib, 1999). 
 
However, these investigations have 
also shown that there is always an 
alternative route of development, which 
tends to “resolve” contradictions within 
the existing structure and without 
transcending it. This route fails to effect 
major progressive breakthroughs and to 
open new research avenues, even though 
it may involve highly sophisticated and 
clever mathematical ploys and innovative 
tricks. 
 
I call the first route the revolutionary 
route, and the second route the 
conservative route. 
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The model example which embodies 
this idea is the events at the end of the 
nineteenth century which led to the theory 
of special Relativity. The principal 
contradiction at the heart of physical 
theory then was the multi- faceted 
contradiction between Newtonian 
Mechanics and Maxwellian 
Electromagnetism. The conservative route 
was followed by Lorentz, who “resolved” 
many aspects of this contradiction, using 
very sophisticated mathematical 
techniques, but without transcending the 
basic structure of Classical Physics 
epitomized by such notions as the ether, 
absolute space, absolute time, and 
absolute mass (Miller, 1986; Einstein et. 
al., 1980).  
 
Of course, the revolutionary route was 
followed by Einstein in his 1905 relativity 
and photon papers. Right from the start, 
from the very first page of his 1905 
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relativity paper, Einstein declared his 
intention to resolve certain “asymmetries” 
by dispensing with the age-old concept of 
ether and radically re-examining the 
concepts of absolute simultaneity and 
absolute space. This led him to replace 
these fundamental concepts with the 
generalized principle of special relativity 
and the amazing principle of the 
constancy of the speed of light in vacuo 
(Einstein, 2005).  
 
We all know where Lorentz’s 
conservative route has led physics (to 
nowhere) and where Einstein’s 
revolutionary route has led it: to General 
Relativity, Particle Physics, Modern 
Cosmology, and the whole of modern 
physics (Kragh, 2002); Jackson, 1987). 
 
In this paper, I intend to show the 
efficacy of this idea of development of 
physical theory in understanding the 
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nature of Arabic physical science, 
particularly Arabic astronomy, in contrast 
with Copernican astronomy and the 
ensuing developments in European 
science. Focusing on the Arabic critique 
of Ptolemy and the alternative 
astronomical models envisaged  by 
various Arabic astronomers, I argue that 
Arabic scientists tended to follow the 
conservative route in resolving the 
contradictions of Greek physical science, 
whereas Copernicus (and later, Kepler) 
followed the revolutionary route . In both 
cases, physics was used as a guide to 
criticize Ptolemy and develop alternative 
models. However, whereas Arabic 
scientists closely followed Aristotelian 
physics, Copernicus and Kepler openly 
defied Aristotelian physics and were 
beginning to feel their way through a 
new, field, physics (Margolis, 2002). 
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However, to fully appreciate this 
characterization, and the nature of 
innovation in Arabic astronomy, I shall 
use the Althusserian notion of 
problematic as a textual tool. However, I 
find this tool, in its original Althusserian 
from, too rigid to theorize developmental 
patterns in scientific theory. I, thus, 
introduce certain “Hegelianized” 
modifications to it, which imbue it with 
noticeable explanatory power. 
 
Finally, I find it necessary to 
emphasize, right from the start, that the 
two routes do not grow separately, and in 
relative isolation from each other. On the 
contrary, they are inextricably tied to each 
other. In particular, the revolutionary 
route is usually unimaginable without the 
conservative route. Was Einstein 
imaginable without the conservative 
Lorentz and the semi – conservative 
Poincaré? Similarly, was Copernicus 
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imaginable without Al- Zarqali,  Al- 
Bitruji, Ibn Al- Haitham, Al – Urdi, Tusi 
and Ibn Shatir, amongst others ? 
 
Louis Althusser (Althusser, 1993; 
Ferrether, 2006; Elliot, 1994) 
 
Louis Althusser is a French 
philosopher, who died in 1990. He is 
usually characterized as a structuralist 
Marxist philosopher.  During the sixties 
and seventies of the pervious century, he 
was at the heart of a fierce ideological 
struggle in French and European left - 
wing circles. However, with the changed 
circumstances, and the accompanying 
retreat of the left worldwide, in the last 
thirty years, Althusser has suffered an 
almost total eclipse and been consigned to 
almost total oblivion. Nevertheless, his 
influence is still noticeable in cultural 
studies, particularly after the publication 
and translation of many hitherto 
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unpublished manuscripts in the last few 
years (Althusser, 2006). Notwithstanding 
his ideological and political eclipse, I 
think that quite a few of his notions could 
be very effective and useful in 
understanding historical texts and events, 
particularly in the sciences. I proclaim 
Althusser’s philosophy as truly pertinent 
to deepening our understanding of the 
dialectic of unity and disunity in the 
history of science. In particular, I deem 
Althusser’s notion of “problematic” to be 
an essential notion for understanding the 
unity of Graeco – Arabic physical science 
vis-a-vis developments in the modern era 
.  
 
I shall, therefore, explain this notion 
as a prelude to applying it to Arabic 
physical science in relation to the 
Copernican Revolution. 
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The Notion of Problematic (Althusser, 
1977; Althusser et.al., 1977) 
 
Althusser avers, right at the start of his 
intellectual career, that the essence of a 
text does not lie in its object. Nor does it 
lie in the individual isolated concepts it 
employs. Rather, it lies in its problematic. 
The fundamental basis of a text is its 
problematic, rather than its basic 
individual concepts. Basically, a 
problematic is a structured conceptual 
hierarchy which animates a text and 
produces its meaning. It is the structural 
condition of the possibility of meaning of 
a text. It defines its semantic space. A 
concept does not acquire its meaning 
from its logical structure. Nor does it 
acquire it from a direct relationship to an 
object outside it. Rather, it does so from 
its problematic and through it. Even its 
relationship to its object is established via 
its problematic. 
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In fact, Althusser arrived at this notion 
of problematic by comparing four sets of 
philosophical texts: Hegel’s, Feuerbach’s, 
the Early Marx’s and the Mature Marx’s. 
He noticed that, ultimately, the first three 
sets shared the same problematic, even 
though they appeared diametrically 
different. For, even though Feuerbach had 
inverted Hegel, he had retained the basic 
underlying Hegelian problematic. Thus, 
the materialist Feuerbach remained a 
prisoner of the idealist Hegelian semantic 
space. Also, even though the Young Marx 
had been concerned with politics and 
political economy, whereas Feuerbach 
had been concerned with religion, 
theology and speculative philosophy, they 
both shared the same problematic – or, to 
be more precise, the Young Marx had 
borrowed Feuerbach’s problematic, and 
applied it to different objects. Thus, the 
notion of problematic helps us to detect 
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basic differences and similarities, and to 
delve deeply into the heart of a text, 
behind a fascade of illusory appearances. 
Apparent breaks are recognized for what 
they truly are – mere variations on a 
theme. On the other hand, surface 
appearances and identities turn out to 
conceal radical breaks and departures. In 
this respect, the notion of problematic 
could be used to assess intellectual 
achievements and their degree of 
originality. 
 
Althusser also used this important 
notion to define intellectual revolutions. 
As long as a text remains tied to the 
existing problematic, it does not 
constitute an intellectual revolution, no 
matter how hard it tries to disguise the 
problematic with seemingly new 
concepts, and to invert structures without 
changing their internal relations. Thus, 
neither Feuerbach nor the Young Marx 
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constituted an intellectual revolution in 
philosophy, particularly vis- a-vis Hegel.  
 
 
On the other hand, the Mature Marx 
did indeed achieve a radical intellectual 
revolution, because he succeeded in 
effecting a so-called epistemological 
break whereby he broke loose from the 
Hegelian-Feuerbachian ideological 
problematic and moved to a new 
scientific problematic epitomized most 
conspicuously by Das Kapital. Thus, 
intellectual revolutions are basically 
epistemological breaks whereby a thinker 
jumps from one problematic to an 
altogether different problematic.  
 
A Hegelianized Version of 
Problematics 
 
The moment one tries to apply 
Althusser’s notion of problematic to the 
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history of physical theory, one encounters 
numerous difficulties related to the 
obvious rigidity of this notion. 
Althusser’s problematic is indeed too 
rigid to explain mutations, transitions and 
movement in physical theory. In fact, it is 
a closed universe, a monad, with no 
mechanisms connecting it to other 
problematics. 
 
Each problematic is almost self-
sufficient, coherent and homogeneous. 
The way out of this impasse for Althusser 
is the notion of epistemological break– a 
quantum leap in the dark with no clear 
mechanism; a blind irrational jump.  
 
 
The way out to salvage this important 
notion is to modify it by introducing 
Hegelian elements in it – in particular, a 
degree of inhomogeneity and dialectical 
contradiction. With this modification, a 
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problematic is transformed from a closed 
static totality into an open dynamic 
totality that moves forward and mutates 
under the pressure of its internal 
contradictions.  The state of 
inhomogeneity in a problematic normally 
arises from an amalgamation or 
coalescence of problematics – i.e., from 
the fact that actual historically constituted 
problematics are hybrids. This also makes 
a problematic not indifferent to its object, 
as Althusser seems to imply. On the 
contrary, a problematic develops and 
accentuates its contradictions by 
interacting with its object, until a point is 
reached where the resolution of these 
contradictions demands the transcendence 
of the problematic. Te be more precise, 
this resolution transforms the existing 
problematic into a new higher one. 
It is this Hegelianized version of the 
notion of problematic that 
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I shall now use to explore the nature and 
significance of Arabic physical Science. 
 
The Problematic of Greek and Arabic 
Physical Science 
 
Arabic physical science spans a period 
of seven continuous centuries (800 A.D. – 
1500 A.D.) (Gingerich, 1986; Rashed, 
1997). It was indeed a period brimming 
with innovation and scientific activity 
.Yet, underlying all this amazing variety 
of ideas and theories, there was a 
constant, essentially unchanging, 
problematic. If one compares a 9th century 
text with a 14th century text, one does not 
fail to notice this constancy in 
problematic. One, of course, finds it hard 
to account for this constancy, in view of 
the many critical spirits that animated 
Arabic physical science.  
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How would one characterize the 
problematic of Arabic Science? Clearly, it 
was basically a Greek problematic. 
Arabic physical Science was principally a 
creative continuation of Greek physical 
Science. In particular, it was an amalgam 
of three "pure" problematics– Plato's, 
Aristotle's and Ptolemy's. They are three 
inter–related, but distinct, pure 
problematics. Plato's problematic, as 
revealed in the Timaeus (Plato, 1978), 
revolves around the idea that the Universe 
is a unique, self–contained, self-sufficient 
and rational being, endowed with perfect 
traits and features, such as a spherical 
shape and components revolving around 
its centre with uniform circular motion. 
The latter traits became a cornerstone of 
physical science, astronomy and 
cosmology in Antiquity. It was deeply 
incorporated in the Aristotelian 
problematic (Sarton, 1966). The latter 
was based on the idea that the Universe is 
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a semi-material, finite,  inhomogeneous, 
mechanical system with a well – defined 
physical centre, that acts as a gathering 
and attractive place for heavy elements 
(earth and water). This spherical system 
knows no outside and no vacuum. It 
consists of two distinct and qualitatively 
different realms: the terrestrial and the 
celestial. The former is characterized by 
change, corruption, birth, death, straight-
line motion and a combination of four 
basic elements (earth, water, air and fire), 
and is described by Aristotelian Physics. 
The latter is characterized by sphericity, 
uniform circular motion, and an eternally 
unchanging substance or element (ether). 
Space is a mere attribute of matter, and 
time is endless. The planets and stars are 
carried by revolving spheres made of 
transparent ether. There is a prime 
unmoved mover that envelopes the whole 
Universe and imparts motion to the 
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various concentric spheres (Aristotle, 
1978). 
 
Ptolemy later developed a 
mathematical problematic, based on work 
done previously by Appollonius, 
Hipparchus and the Babylonians 
(Barbour, 2001). He employed such 
geometrodynamic concepts as the 
eccentric, deferent, epicycle and equant. 
In fact, as an astronomer seeking to 
describe and "explain" data and 
measurements, he was truly revolutionary 
in light of later developments, especially 
Kepler's work. However, as a physicist, 
he was truly conservative, true to the 
Aristotelian problematic. He hoisted his 
revolutionary mathematical problematic 
onto the Aristotelian problematic, 
creating an explosive, contradictory 
amalgam that would stamp the dynamic 
of physical science for the following 
millennium and a half. 
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 The Dilemmas and Dynamics of 
Arabic  Physical Science 
 
The problematic Arabic physical 
scientists inherited from the Greeks was 
an inhomogeneous, contradictory 
problematic. The principal contradiction 
was the multifaceted contradiction 
between the Ptolemaic mathematical 
apparatus and Aristotle's physics. Arabic 
astronomers felt dissatisfied with 
Ptolemaic methods on account of this 
contradiction and some observational 
flaws they discovered in Ptolemy's 
system.    
 
Basically, there were three main 
currents or traditions in Arabic 
astronomy: the observational (zij), the 
Shukuk tradition enunciated by Al- 
Hassan  ibn  Al – Haitharn,  and the 
model- building tradition ( Bitruji, Urdi, 
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Tusi, Ibn Shatir). They all moved and 
produced ideas within the confines of the 
inherited  problematic (Saliba, 1994). In 
spite of their highly critical attitudes and 
creative talents, none ventured to move 
forward beyond it. The models the model-
builders constructed fitted better in the 
edifice of the main Aristotelian 
problematic than Ptolemy's models. All 
Arabic astronomers, including those 
belonging to the zij tradition, were 
acutely aware of the contradictory status 
of their problematic, and they tended to 
use their great mathematical skills to 
resolve those contradictions, guided by 
Aristotelian  principles . 
 
In a sense, Arabic astronomers 
developed the conservative elements in 
the ancient problematic at the expense of 
the revolutionary elements; Aristotle at 
the expense of Ptolemy. They evidently 
opted for the conservative route of 
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development. Their efforts were directed 
at taming the rebellious elements in 
Ptolemy. Ibn Al-Haitham's Shukuk found 
their consummation in the Maragha 
School; in Urdi's, Tusi's and Ibn Shatir's 
models and mathematical innovations. Of 
course, they were unable to dispense 
completely with Ptolemy's mathematical 
methods. So, they resorted to a selection 
process according to taste within the 
confines of Aristotelian principles. They 
all agreed on the necessity of dispensing 
with the most revolutionary element in 
Ptolemy– namely, the equant. As we 
know, Tusi was able to replace it with his 
famous "couple". Ibn Shatir built models 
that were free from equants and 
eccentrics, but that contained deferents 
and epicycles, and he had to modify 
slightly Aristotle's theory of the ether to 
justify that. It was as though Arabic 
astronomers used all their  mathematical 
ingenuity and genius to save the Greek 
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problematic from its own contradictions. 
Their ideal was to create purely 
Aristotelian planetary models that 
accorded well with the observations. The 
purest Aristotelian system was built by 
Al-Bitruji in Andalus, but turned out to be 
inaccurate, compared with Ptolemy's (Al-
Bitruji, 1971). Thus, Arabic astronomers 
had no choice but to retain some 
Ptolemaic elements. 
 
 
 
 
 
If we compare ancient astronomy to 
physics at the end of the 19th century, we 
could characterize the situation as 
follows: Ptolemy was the Planck of 
ancient astronomy, Arabic astronomers 
were its Lorentz, whilst Copernicus, 
Galileo and Kepler were its Einstein. 
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The pivotal questioning that would 
explode the ancient problematic along the 
revolutionary route was, of course, that  
related to the Earth–centered hypothesis. 
Copernicus readily adopted the solutions 
that had been offered by Arabic 
astronomers, because they satisfied his 
Platonic aesthetic taste. In this, he was as 
conservative as Arabic scientists. 
However, he differed from them in being 
a Platonist, rather than an Aristotelian 
(Kuhn, 1981; Koyre, 1973).  That must 
have facilitated his heliocentric 
revolution. It was indeed a revolution, 
because it challenged the whole 
Aristotelian edifice, and pointed towards 
a new, field, physics– modern physics. 
Thus, both Arabic astronomers and their 
European counterparts used physics to 
guide their astronomical practice. 
However, whereas the former tended to 
stick to Aristotelian physics in this 
endeavour, the latter tended to challenge 
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it and use rudiments and intimations of a 
new, field, physics to guide their model-
building. In particular, Kepler used a field 
physical model, inspired by Gilbert's 
magnetic force model, to investigate the 
way the sun influenced the motion of the 
planets, and that played a crucial role in 
arriving at his laws of planetary motion. 
In fact, it enabled him to discover the 
revolutionary content of the Ptolemaic 
equant– the fact that it was a first 
approximation of an elliptical orbit 
(Stephenson, 1987). Thus, unlike Arabic 
astronomers, who had rejected the equant 
and retained the epicycle, he opted for the 
former and rejected the latter. He proved 
to be the ultimate embodiment of the 
revolutionary route.  
The preceding analysis inevitably 
raises the following questions: Why did 
Arabic astronomers follow the 
conservative Lorentzian route, despite 
their acute critical acumen and brilliant 
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creative mathematical skills? Why did the 
Copernican Revolution have to await a 
Renaissance Central European – or, more 
precisely, two such astronomers 
(Copernicus and Kepler)? Why did 
Arabic astronomers stick so stubbornly to 
Aristotelian physics, and felt so inimical 
towards the revolutionary elements in 
Ptolemy?  
 
The Rise and Demise of Arabic 
Rationalism 
 
It is our contention that Arabic theoretical 
astronomy was closely related to Arabic 
rationalism, which means that the fate of 
the former was organically tied to the fate 
of the latter. My thesis here is that Arabic 
rationalism, which had been adopted by 
the early Abbasid state, particularly 
during the reigns of Al-Mansour and Al-
Ma'moun, was soon to come under fire 
from orthodox religious quarters (Al-
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Jabiri, 1985). The ascendancy of this 
orthodoxy and the alliance it forged with 
the militarist feudalist Islamic state 
weakened Arabic rationalism, and placed 
it under constant siege. Eventually it was 
liquidated completely by this alliance. Its 
last bastion was Arabic astronomy. The 
rationalists felt constantly threatened by 
that inimical force. This explains why 
they stubbornly stuck to Aristotelian 
rationalism, and were reluctant to 
transcend it. The fact that the battle for 
rationalism was lost in Arabic civilization 
accounts for this stubborn adherence to 
Aristotelian physics as opposed to 
Ptolemaic innovations. Because Arabic 
rationalists were under siege in their last 
bastion, their chief task was to defend 
Aristotelian rationalism, and not to 
critique it. That also offers a partial 
explanation of why Arabic astronomy 
reached its zenith in the age of decline.  
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Arabic rationalism declined and was 
eventually liquidated for various socio-
cultural reasons, one of which was its 
failure to forge a compromise with 
religious dogma and to carve a niche for 
itself in the Islamic religious enterprise. It 
was a double failure, whereby each 
enterprise failed to accommodate itself to 
the other. In Europe, the exact opposite 
occurred. In spite of the initial hostile 
response of the Church to Aristotelian and 
Averroist rationalism (Grant, 1971; Grant, 
1974), eventually a historic compromise 
was reached between the two enterprises, 
and Aristotelianism was absorbed by 
Church dogma, thanks chiefly to the 
brilliant efforts of Thomas Aquinas. The 
fact that Aristotelian rationalism became 
part of the official dogma made it 
possible for later generations to critique it 
in the name of a higher rationalism. The 
consolidation of Aristotelian rationalism 
in European civilization was a 
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precondition for its thorough critique in 
the name of a higher rationalism. This 
difference in attitude is best illustrated by 
contrasting Kepler's attitude to Ptolemy's 
equant with the late Arabic astronomers' 
attitude to it. Arabic astronomers were 
vehement in rejecting this Ptolemaic 
device, because it contradicted 
Aristotelian physics, which was part of 
Aristotelian rationalism. Their strict 
normative adherence to this rationalism 
drove them to view the equant as an 
irrational element in Ptolemaic 
astronomy. Of course, Copernicus was to 
follow suit. On the other hand, Kepler 
was to reject the Ptolemaic epicycle and 
rehabilitate the Ptolemaic equant in the 
name of a new, burgeoning, physics and 
rationality. The triumph of Aristotelian 
rationalism in medieval Europe was a 
prelude to its later demise and its 
replacement by a new rationalism, what I 
call scientific rationalism. On the other 
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hand, its defeat in Arabic medieval 
civilization was an impediment to 
transcending it towards a new science and 
a new rationalism. It was a prelude to the 
eclipse of rationalism as such in Arabic 
civilization. 
The besieged status of Aristotelian 
rationalism drove Arabic astronomers to 
seek solutions to the problems of 
theoretical Arabic astronomy within the 
confines of Aristotelian physics and 
cosmology, just as Lorentz later did with 
respect to classical electrodynamics (Pais, 
2008). The consolidation of Aristotelian 
rationalism in Arabic civilization would 
have been a necessary precondition for its 
transcendence towards modern scientific 
rationalism— i.e., for the Copernicus-
Kepler astronomical revolution to occur 
in the Arabic middle ages. 
 
Metaphysical Rationalism Versus 
Scientific Rationalism 
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To understand the significance of this 
contrast and the associated intellectual 
processes, we need to understand the 
distinguishing features of both antique 
rationalism—i.e., the rationalism that 
prevailed in both Greek and Arabic 
antiquity—and modern rationalism, 
which has prevailed since the scientific 
revolution (1543-1687). 
I call antique rationalism metaphysical 
rationalism. In Arabic civilization, this 
rationalism existed in quite a few forms: 
Aristotelian or Peripatetic, Platonic, Neo-
Platonic (Plotinus) and Kalamic ( both 
Mu'tazilite and Ash'arite). These 
rationalist forms were combined with 
various forms of irrational currents, such 
as Pythagoreanism, mysticism, astrology, 
alchemy, magic, oriental creeds, 
gnosticism and hermeticism (Al-Jabiri, 
1986). This rationalism reached its apex 
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in Aristotelian rationalism, and, in 
particular, in Ibn Rushd (Al-Jabiri, 2001).  
In Atistotelian rationalism, there were two 
sources of certainty: pure reason and the 
raw senses. A set of metaphysical 
principles were derived from pure reason, 
and considered solid bases of certain 
knowledge, on the one hand, and the 
world of sense was taken uncritically for 
granted, on the other. The essence of 
Aristotelian physics lay in emphasizing 
nature related metaphysical principles, 
and, then, saving the phenomena with 
them. Attempts were made to account for 
the raw phenomena of the world of the 
senses in terms of these metaphysical 
principles via formal logic and the 
syllogism. The latter was the bridge 
between metaphysics and the senses. The 
world of metaphysical principles and the 
world of the senses were related via the 
syllogism. That was the essence of 
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Aristotelian methodology and 
metaphysical rationalism. 
A new rationalism was to arise during the 
17th century—scientific rationalism. 
Whereas Arabic astronomers and 
physicists failed to transcend 
metaphysical rationalism to scientific 
rationalism, conditions were ripe for 17th 
century European scientists to do that. 
Basing our conclusions on a thorough 
study of the 17th century scientific 
revolution, we outline here some of the 
distinguishing features of scientific 
rationalism (Ghassib, August, 2010): 
1- The relationship between philosophy 
and science was inverted. Instead of 
science being appended to metaphysics, 
generally speaking, metaphysics and 
philosophy became appended to science. 
Instead of philosophy guiding science, 
from then on, science would guide 
philosophy. 
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2- Whereas antique science focused on 
the actual as revealed by the senses, and 
in the light of the metaphysical abstract, 
modern science would focus on the 
potential, the possible, the mathematically 
amenable abstract. Whereas the former 
tried to find out how first (metaphysical) 
principles produced raw phenomena, 
modern science would try to discover the 
mathematical principles followed by the 
potential and possible. The latter would 
then dialectically fuse these principles 
together and universalize them to arrive at 
deeper material causal principles. In 
short, mathematical deduction and 
dialectical synthesis have replaced the 
syllogism, on the one hand, and material 
causes have replaced first principles and 
metaphysical causes, on the other 
3- In antique science, philosophy was 
endowed with the function of producing 
knowledge. It was a necessary tool of 
knowledge production. In modern 
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knowledge production, it has lost this 
function, and the latter has been replaced 
by the function of transcendentally 
grounding scientific practice, and other 
practices as well. 
4- Science has become autonomous. In 
particular, it has gained its independence 
of theology, philosophy, the crafts and 
political authority. Scientific reason has 
become an authority unto itself. 
5- Notwithstanding quantum mechanics, 
modern science presupposes the ideas of 
the materiality and infinitude of the 
world. It also presupposes that causes are 
internal to the Universe, and a new 
causality based on material interactions 
between material components. 
6- In modern science, the world of the 
senses is no more a source of certainty. It 
is not considered entirely objective, but 
partly subjectively constituted. The senses 
are basically defective measurement 
instruments. Knowledge needs more 
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accurate and precise measuring 
instruments. These are furnished, not by 
the senses, but by scientific reason, which 
is, thus, the eye of truth and our probe of 
reality. Modern science presupposes the 
existence of primary and secondary 
qualities and properties—i.e., it 
presupposes the dichotomy of appearance 
and reality. 
7- Modern knowledge is mathematically 
structured. This means that it is 
axiomatically based. It presupposes a set 
of axioms. However, scientific axioms are 
not absolute, but relative and conditional. 
They are testable and studied 
presuppositions. They are constantly 
under scrutiny and constantly tested via 
their deductive consequences. They are 
always provisional. In metaphysical 
rationalism, on the other hand, axioms 
have an absolute and sacred character. 
8- The mathematical experimental 
essence of scientific rationalism imposes 
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a set of ethical norms on scientific 
practice, which is alien to metaphysical 
rationalism. 
9- Modern science and rationalism are 
essentially absolutely critical, dialectical, 
unifying, materialist and causal in the 
materialist sense. Metaphysical 
rationalism tended to be dogmatic, 
formally syllogistic, fragmenting, idealist 
and causal in the theological sense. 
10- The animating principle of scientific 
practice and rationalism is scientific 
reason. Science has no reference point 
save scientific reason. The animating 
principle of metaphysical rationalism was 
transcendental reasoning.  
 
Conclusion 
We have hegelianized Althusser's concept 
of problematic, and applied it to Arabic 
astronomy, to uncover the underlying 
unity of that science. We have shown that 
Arabic astronomers chose to follow the 
 37
conservative route of development a la 
Lorentz, unlike Kepler, who decided later 
to follow the revolutionary route a la 
Einstein. We, then, offered an explanation 
of why that occurred, in terms of a 
contrast we have detailed between 
metaphysical rationalism and scientific 
rationalism. 
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